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Background: Chemotherapy administration is a high-risk process. Aim of this study was to evaluate the frequency,
type, preventability, as well as potential and actual severity of outpatient chemotherapy prescribing errors in an
Oncology Department where electronic prescribing is used.
Methods: Up to three electronic prescriptions per patient record were selected from the clinical records of
consecutive patients who received cytotoxic chemotherapy between January 2007 and December 2008. Wrong
prescriptions were classified as incomplete, incorrect or inappropriate. Error preventability was classified using a
four-point scale. Severity was defined according to the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Severity Scale.
Results: Eight hundred and thirty-five prescriptions were eligible. The overall error rate was 20%. Excluding
systematic errors (i.e. errors due to an initially faulty implementation of chemotherapy protocols into computerized
dictionaries) from the analysis, the error rate decreased to 8%. Incomplete prescriptions were the majority. Most
errors were deemed definitely preventable. According to error presumptive potential for damage, 72% were
classified as minor; only 3% had the potential to produce major or catastrophic injury. Sixty-eight percent were
classified as near misses; adverse drug events had no or little effect on clinical outcome.
Conclusions: Chemotherapy prescribing errors may arise even using electronic prescribing. Although periodic
audits may be useful to detect common errors and guide corrective actions, it is crucial to get the computerized
physician order entry system and set-ups correct before implementation.
Keywords: Adverse drug event, Chemotherapy, Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems, Information
technology, Prescribing errors, OutpatientBackground
Chemotherapy administration is an error-prone, high-
risk process [1,2]. The reasons are well known. The
number and complexity of chemotherapy regimens are
increasing steadily; most cytotoxic drugs have a narrow
therapeutic range; dose adjustments are often needed;
cancer patients are particularly susceptible to drug inter-
actions [3]; and medication delivery is an intricate* Correspondence: fasola.gianpiero@aoud.sanita.fvg.it
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stated.process, with each step being a potentially significant
source of error.
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems are
widely regarded as being crucial to reduce hospital medica-
tion errors. In the American Society of Health-System
Pharmacists (ASHP) 2002 guidelines on preventing chemo-
therapy prescribing errors, CPOE systems are claimed to
offer superior results over pre-printed prescription forms,
due to additional features such as the removal of interpret-
ation/transcription errors, the availability of information
about drug doses/schedules, the automatic calculation of. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
ain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise
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tions [4].
Relatively few studies have investigated the impact of
computerized systems on the reduction of medication er-
rors in oncology; most evidence comes from other special-
ties or is derived from data about the use of standardized
paper prescription forms. Moreover, available data are often
conflicting. A meta-analysis of 12 studies showed a 66%
overall reduction (odds ratio = 0.34; 95% confidence interval
0.22-0.52) in medication errors when a CPOE system was
employed [5]. On the other hand, a qualitative study identi-
fied 22 types of medication error risks facilitated by the use
of a CPOE system [6]. Examples included patient or medi-
cation selection errors due to fragmented CPOE displays
preventing a coherent view of patients’ details and medica-
tions, pharmacy inventory displays mistaken for dosage
guidelines, ignored antibiotic renewal notices placed on
paper charts rather than in the CPOE system, medication
discontinuation failures, immediate orders and pro re nata
(PRN) medication discontinuation faults, double dosing
and incompatible orders facilitated by separation of func-
tions, and wrong orders due to inflexible ordering formats.
Indeed, the variability of error definitions and classification
systems among different studies makes the interpretation
and comparison of results very difficult. Overall, little is
known on the type and frequency of prescribing errors in
cancer patients and there is no conclusive evidence that in-
formation technology (IT) may exert any specific influence
over them.
The main aim of the present study was to evaluate the
frequency of chemotherapy prescribing errors in an On-
cology outpatient unit equipped with a CPOE system. A
secondary aim was to stratify these errors by type, pre-
ventability, potential severity as well as actual clinical
impact. The study was part of the Italian National
Health Service project “Management of cancer patients:
procedures for good clinical practice and risk manage-
ment supported by information systems”.
Methods
Setting
This retrospective, observational study was conducted at
the Department of Oncology, University Hospital of Udine,
Italy. The local information system, named G2, is entirely
home-grown and was first introduced in 2001. It initially
consisted of a core element, i.e. a CPOE program for
chemotherapy prescription, which was used exclusively by
the Department of Oncology. Over the years, G2 was grad-
ually developed into an electronic medical record system
covering all the aspects of patient care and it is now used
by all the Departments at Udine University Hospital and
several other Hospitals in North-East Italy. The system al-
lows physicians to manage, store and retrieve all relevant
patient information, to schedule outpatient appointmentsand treatments, to prescribe therapies, and to draw-up clin-
ical letters and discharge summaries. In particular, the G2
CPOE system offers several features potentially improving
the safety and efficiency of chemotherapy prescribing, such
as an up-to-date glossary of chemotherapy drugs and regi-
mens, the computerized calculation of drug doses (based
on anthropometric and/or biochemical variables), recom-
mendations for dose adjustments, patient take-home in-
structions, and some alert functions (e.g. warning messages
in case of overdosage risk or when critical values for the
correct calculation of drug doses are missing).
Eligibility criteria and record screening
Computerized prescriptions were selected from medical re-
cords of consecutive cancer outpatients who received active
treatment between 1st January 2007 and 31st December
2008 at the Oncology Department in Udine. At the study
start date, the implementation of the G2 CPOE system had
been successfully completed and the system had reached a
stage of full operation.
Prescriptions for cytotoxic chemotherapy regimens were
eligible. Exclusion criteria were: (i) prescriptions issued by
not fully qualified oncologists, i.e. supervised oncology
trainees; (ii) prescriptions for treatments within a clinical
trial. A maximum of three prescriptions for each record
were analyzed. Prescriptions were independently reviewed
by two medical oncology residents specifically trained for
this purpose. Both the online prescription and its printed
version were considered; in case of inconsistency between
the two versions, the latter was deemed to prevail, since the
prescription hard copy still represents the basis document
for chemotherapy preparation. Thus, if an error in the elec-
tronic prescription had been corrected in the printed ver-
sion, that prescription was considered correct and the error
was not taken into account in the analysis.
A specifically developed form was used to register es-
sential demographic and clinical data of study patients
and, where appropriate, the error description and its
categorization by type, potential preventability, potential
severity and actual clinical impact. Data were collected
in pseudo-anonymized form.
Two medical oncology specialists independently reviewed
all compiled forms for completeness, accuracy and correct-
ness. Disagreements were solved by discussion until
consensus was reached. In the event of persistent disagree-
ment, the study coordinator was competent.
The study was approved by the Independent Ethics
Committee of the Udine University Hospital, Udine,
Italy.
Error classification and analysis
Chemotherapy prescribing errors were both evaluated as a
whole and classified by error type, potential preventability,
potential severity and actual clinical impact.
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system proposed by Potts and colleagues [7] (Table 1).
The appropriateness of prescriptions was evaluated ac-
cording to the drug registration trials, label information
and national/international guidelines [8-10]. As for cor-
rectness, all dosages were verified using a web-available
instrument for the automatic calculation of the body
surface area (DuBois Formula) [11] and a carboplatin
AUC calculator based on the modified Cockcroft-Gault
method [12]. Possible drug interactions were searched
for using a free Drug Interaction Checker software [13];
only interactions with a potentially major level of sever-
ity were considered as “errors”.
We assessed potential preventability of errors adapting
a validated Likert scale to differentiate between definitely
not preventable, probably not preventable, probably pre-
ventable, and definitely preventable errors [14] (Table 2).
Error potential severity, based on the plausible level of
patient injury, was classified using the Healthcare Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) Severity Rating
Scale [15] (Table 2). To assess their real clinical impact,
errors were distinguished among near misses [16] and
preventable adverse drug events (ADE) [17] (Table 2).
The severity of ADE was judged using the same rating
scale as above [15].
The analysis of all the secondary endpoints (type of
error, degree of preventability, severity and clinical im-
pact) was pre-planned.Results
Prescription selection
Medical records of 1928 patients who attended the Out-
patient Oncology Department at the Udine University
Hospital between 1st January 2007 and 31st December
2008 were screened (Figure 1). Eighty-three percent
(1594 out of 1928) of screened records were not eligible;
main reasons for exclusion are shown in Figure 1.
Overall, 334 records were eligible; up to three prescrip-




No support for that regimen at such doses, in that
setting or patient, according to age, performance status,
baseline organ function, comorbidities, tumor type/stage,
potential for drug interactions/allergic reactions, etc.
Incomplete
prescription
Missing dosage, unit of measure, administration route,




Medication order showing wrong drug, wrong dosage
(depending on variations of the body surface area, organ
function, or previous toxicities), wrong unit of measure,
wrong administration route, wrong type and volume of
infusion solutions, wrong infusion time, etc.835 prescriptions (Figure 1). One, two and three prescrip-
tions were analyzed in 55, 57 and 222 records, respectively.
Patient median age was 64 years (interquartile range:
54–70); 61% of patients were females. Breast, colorectal,
other gastrointestinal tumors and lung cancer were the
most common tumor types (33%, 23%, 13% and 12% of
all eligible cases, respectively). Most patients had locally
advanced (52%) or metastatic (32%) disease.
Error analysis
Records containing one or more prescribing errors were
79 out of 334 (24%). Prescriptions with errors were 167
out of 835, for an overall error rate of 20%. Eleven pre-
scriptions (1%) contained more than 1 error, for an over-
all number of 181 errors (Figure 1).
Incomplete prescriptions were the most frequent
(66%), followed by incorrect and inappropriate prescrip-
tions (28% and 6%, respectively). Incomplete prescrip-
tions (n = 110) failed to specify the administration route
(n = 101), the infusion solution volume (n = 2) or the
number of capsules to be dispensed in case of oral
chemotherapy (n = 7). Incorrect prescriptions (n = 47)
included: errors of over/underdosage, due to failure in
modifying dose based on previous toxicity or on varia-
tions of biochemical parameters; and re-exposure to
drugs causing a previous reaction. Inappropriate pre-
scriptions (n = 10) included: errors in drug dose(s) or
treatment selection with respect to patient age, tumor
type or organ function (n = 8); omission of primary
prophylaxis with a granulocyte colony-stimulating factor
in a patient at high risk of febrile neutropenia (n = 1);
prescription in the absence of recent full blood count
and biochemistry results (n = 1).
The analysis by error type revealed a significant propor-
tion of systematic errors which were derived from errors in
the predefined chemotherapy protocols, such as failure to
specify route of administration or volume of infusion solu-
tion; these errors were often present in prescriptions which
would have been otherwise error-free. We labeled these
systematic errors as a priori errors. Wrong prescriptions
due to a priori errors were 103. After excluding these er-
rors, the overall error rate declined from 20% to 8%. The
proportion of different error types also changed substan-
tially: incomplete prescriptions rate fell from 66% to 11%,
whereas the rate of incorrect and inappropriate prescrip-
tions raised from 28% to 73% and 6% to 16%, respectively.
The majority of errors were deemed probably (33%) or
definitely (66%) preventable.
An effort was made to judge error severity taking in con-
sideration their presumptive potential for damage, inde-
pendently from clinical outcomes. In this perspective, 72%
and 25% of errors were classified as minor and moderate,
respectively, whereas 2% and 1% had at least the potential
to produce major or catastrophic injuries.


















Minor No injury, nor increased length of stay nor increased level of care.
Moderate Increased length of stay or increased level of care for 1 or 2 patients.
Major Permanent lessening of bodily functioning, disfigurement, surgical intervention required, increased length
of stay for 3 or more patients, increased level of care for 3 or more patients.
Catastrophic Death or major permanent loss of function, suicide, rape, hemolytic transfusion reaction. Surgery/




Preventable ADEb Injuries resulting from an error at any stage throughout the medication process.
Near misses Errors detected and intercepted before any harm is done.
aNS: not specified; bADE: Adverse Drug Event.
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identified errors, sixty-eight percent were classified as near
misses. Registered ADE had no or little effect on patient
clinical outcome; there were no major or catastrophic ADE.
The potential severity, potential preventability, and actual
clinical impact of the identified errors are summarized in
Table 3.
Discussion
Medication errors remain one of the most common
causes of morbidity and death among patients [18].










Eligible records:  n = 334
corresponding to 835 prescriptions
Prescriptions with errors
167 out of 835 (20%)
Prescri
668
Figure 1 Schematic representation of the study results.namely prescribing, dispensing and administration, most
of the medication errors occur during the first phase
[13,19-22]. Prescribing errors may have catastrophic
consequences, especially when involved drugs have nar-
row therapeutic index, as it is the case of chemotherapy.
The use of IT has been advocated to reduce the occur-
rence of medication errors [4]. Specifically, CPOE sys-
tems may reduce the frequency of prescribing and
probably dispensing errors, whereas other IT solutions
(e.g. barcode assisted medication administration and
radio frequency identification technologies) may reduce
the occurrence of dispensing and administration errors.gible records:  n = 1594
72%) no chemotherapy prescribed
%) treatment within clinical trial
%) prescriptions not by independent 
ers
%) patients referred from/to other centers
) other reasons (e.g. inpatient treatment)
 
ptions without errors
 out of 835 (80%)
Table 3 Breakdown of errors by potential severity,
preventability and actual clinical impact
All errors n = 181





Potential preventability, n (%)
Definitely preventable 120 (66)
Probably preventable 60 (33)
Probably not preventable 1 (1)
Not preventable 0 (0)
Actual clinical impact, n (%)
Preventable ADEa 58 (32)
Near misses 123 (68)
aADE: Adverse Drug Event.
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IT. In our study, set in an outpatient Oncology unit
where a CPOE system is in use, we observed an overall
chemotherapy prescribing error rate of 20%, which is
higher than previously published reports from oncology
settings [23-31]. Possible explanations for such a differ-
ence include the use of different CPOE systems, variabil-
ity in the definition of prescribing errors and also
differences in study design and error calculation. In our
study, most of the errors were actually due to mistakes
in the configuration of system information, which were
automatically incorporated into otherwise error-free
prescriptions; we have labeled these system-induced pre-
scribing errors as “a priori errors”. Excluding the a priori
errors, error frequency fell to 8%, a figure similar to
those reported in previous studies [23,29]. Most import-
ant, virtually all these a priori errors were formal rather
than substantial errors.
The high proportion of system-induced errors highlights
the importance of standardization of computer systems,
which creates a uniform model that may reduce the
complexity and variability of a specific process [32].
Standardization may be a potential source of systematic
error. In our study we found situations in which the CPOE
system not only introduced a priori errors but also facili-
tated de novo errors. Most of them were related to “Copy
and Paste” functions. When used right, these functions are
of unquestionable value. However, they may also raise sev-
eral problems [33]. Probably, the most dangerous occur-
rence is that of a medical prescription created with a simple
order (“generate a new cycle”) as a copy of a previous pre-
scription, with no need to confirm relevant information
(patient weight, organ function, previous toxicity requiring
dose reduction). Among 47 incorrect prescriptions in ourstudy, most consisted in errors of over/underdosage, due to
failure in modifying the dose based on toxicity or on varia-
tions of biochemical parameters after the new cycle pre-
scription had been generated as a copy of the previous
cycle. One could argue that operators should always main-
tain an “attentional control mode” to monitor automatic
functions [33]. Since in our system a printed copy is always
associated with the electronic prescription, physicians
would have had the possibility of manually editing faulty
prescriptions. Unfortunately, using the attentional mode is
“effortful and difficult to sustain for more than brief pe-
riods” [34]. For this reason, stakeholders have already noted
that it is vital to get protocols right the first time, as their
complexity often makes it difficult to detect configuration
errors later on. In some realities a dedicated human re-
source has been assigned to constantly refine the protocols
based on feedback from clinicians and to develop new
pathways for the management of new medicines [35]. As a
result of this study, we have corrected all the mistakes iden-
tified in the CPOE system settings, i.e. mistakes in the dic-
tionaries of the predefined chemotherapy protocols and we
have undertaken an in-depth review of existing protocols
and dictionaries to check their accuracy. Currently, we are
working on an updated version of the CPOE system, in
which all information functions are separated in two do-
mains: the first is “a context area”, with clinical data on pa-
tients’ history, past and current treatments, laboratory/
radiological exams; in the second section, alerts will play a
key role in the management of compelling information, as
the system will detect the lack of crucial data and hold up
the access to critical functions until the appropriate field is
filled in.
The errors identified in this study had no or little impact
on patients. Briefly, the majority of errors (68%) were near
misses. These errors were intercepted by a pharmacist,
chemotherapy nurse or clinician, and corrected before any
harm was caused to the patient. Specifically, most of these
errors were systematic prescribing errors due to errors in
the predefined chemotherapy protocols (the a priori er-
rors); examples of these errors are failure to specify the ad-
ministration route, solution volume or infusion time in the
prescription. In these cases, the errors were detected and
the prescriptions amended before chemotherapy was pre-
pared and/or administered. The remaining errors were not
detected and resulted in ADE. These events, all potentially
preventable, did not result in significant harm to the
patient. Examples are errors of chemotherapy dose due to
failure in recalculating the chemotherapy dose based on
up-to-date body weight or taking into account changes in
organ function or previous toxicity, omission of adequate
allergy prophylaxis following a reaction as per local guide-
lines, omission to prescribe prophylactic G-CSF in a patient
at high risk of neutropenic fever. None of these patients ex-
perienced significant toxicity as a result of the error but we
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or catastrophic consequences in a few cases. Of note, most
of these errors are prevented in the updated version of the
CPOE system with the presence of mandatory fields for up-
to-date weight, critical blood results and alerts in case of in-
adequate parameters/values.
It has been suggested that comparing the frequency of
medication errors among different healthcare organizations
is meaningless, due to differences in culture, definition of
medication error, patient populations served, and types of
detection and reporting systems [36]. While we agree that
some differences - such as the particular composition of pa-
tient population, or the system used to identify errors and
adverse events - may be difficult to overcome, we firmly be-
lieve that reporting of events is worthwhile, provided that
data are analyzed and that analysis stems from a shared
classification. Indeed, such an approach might start the
process of developing generalized solutions. Unfortunately,
a number of systems have been used so far, and taxonomic
differences make data difficult to be shared. No classifica-
tion system has been validated, nor has demonstrated to
offer significant improvements in patient safety. A major
limitation of our research seems to lie in the degree of clas-
sification detail: even when we simply considered the po-
tential for damage of identified errors - rather than their
real outcome - more than 90% were judged to be minor/
moderate errors. There is a need for a more detailed and
standardized definition and classification of prescribing er-
rors, to collect useful and usable information which may ul-
timately be applied to improve patient care, guide health
policy planning and perform good quality research [37].
Several other study limitations should be acknowledged,
mainly the level of training and endeavor needed to identify
errors through charts review and data collection; the lack of
standardization of this error-capturing approach; and the
weakness and possible biases of a quality observational
study.Conclusions
The present study provides further evidence that
chemotherapy prescribing errors arise even when
CPOE systems are used. It is crucial that protocols
are set up correctly before implementing electronic
prescribing. Once the CPOE goes live, periodic audits
are needed to detect and promptly correct common
errors related not only with the existing protocols but
also with the new chemotherapy protocols constantly
added to the CPOE dictionaries.
Additional evaluation of CPOE systems for chemotherapy
prescribing is needed and should be the focus of large pro-
spective and ideally multicenter studies. The development
of standard definitions for error type and the use of robust
study designs are vital.Abbreviations
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ASHP: American Society of Health-System Pharmacists; HFMEA: Healthcare
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